Congratulations to our first Student Spotlight author, Mohammed Al-Husari for contributing this excellent essay on the future of political Islam.
“I went to the West and saw Islam, but no Muslims; I got back to the East and saw Muslims, but not Islam” this quote is attributed to the Egyptian scholar Muhammad Abduh in 1888. This simple adage concisely illustrates the integral problems and ambitions of Islamist movements throughout the twentieth century (C20) till modern-day politics. It was in the early twentieth century that Hassan Al-Banna founded the Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt (MB) and then Abu ala Mawdudi began expanding his Muslim revivalist approach creating the Jamat-i-islami, before Sayyid Qutb took the radical turn. The works of Al-Banna, Mawdudi and Qutb supplied the blueprint for Sunni Islamism model (Brown, 2000). Islam is seen as an integral part in politics, there is no distinction between Islam and politics. Islam has always been politicised, which some scholar’s view as an explanation for the incompatibility with Western values (Dalacoura, 2007). Political Islam or Islamism is identified as a collection of ideas and practices which build on the principle that Islam as a faith should guide the social, political and personal life (Brown, 2000).
This political ideology considers Islam as a religion that is complete and with a unique system which aims to eventually convert society into an Islamic one (Lucia Ardovini, 2017). Oliver Roy writes: “the Islamist movement thus conceives itself explicitly as a socio-political movement, founded on Islam defined as much in terms of a political ideology as in terms of a religion” (Roy, 1992). The interconnectedness of the principle deen wa dawla, “faith and state”, and its discrepancy has consequently influenced many foreign policies and their attitudes to the region by several Western States (Brown, 2000). The common Western perception shared by prominent politicians and policy makers, is one that makes Islamism synonymous with violence, terrorism and authoritarianism, aiding the rise of Islamophobia and the erection of Muslims as the “other”.To explain the brief resurgence of Islamist movements in the modern state post “Arab-spring” of 2011, I will examine the tragic attempt by the Muslim brotherhood (MB) or Jama’at al-ikhwan al-muslimin under the Freedom and Justice party (FJP) in Egypt. This essay will cover Oliver Roy’s account of the “failure” of political Islam, as his work illustrates certain frictions within the doctrine as a whole and presents a rather fascinating argument for its failure to govern.
Islam and the West are often seen as the antithesis of each other (Dalacoura, 2007). The West, in the Western perspective, is believed to be closely related with democracy and human rights, whereas Islam, and more so the orient, is seen as inherently anti-democratic and barbaric. According to a survey, between 40% and 60% of Americans hold prejudice against Muslims, and links Islam with terrorism and violence (Brookings et al, 2015). In his book ‘The clash of civilisations?’, Samuel Huntington says “Islam’s borders are bloody and so are its innards. The fundamental problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam…” (Huntington, 1996). Notice his word choice. The political scientist Francis Fukuyama wrote in the Wall Street Journal, “Islam, by contrast, is the only cultural system that seems regularly to produce people like Osama bin Laden or the Taliban who reject modernity lock, stock and barrel” (Fukuyama, 2001).
What these leading scholars fail to do is to clearly differentiate between legitimate Islamist-esque political movements and militant Islamist groups. This creates a grey buffer zone of vagueness which allows for the grave sin- the sweeping generalization of entire communities and populations. This enables the pervasive existing Islamophobia and marginalisation of societies. It develops the Western view of Islam that are often fuelled by preconception, which creates hostile conflicts with co-citizens, that are pushed forward by the mass media’s portrayal of Islam and Muslims as associated with extremism, barbarism and terror- befitting the political agenda and justifying both strict domestic and coercive foreign policy. A recent study discovered that for the past twenty years, the conservative media in France actively used securitising language to the public, with the aim to isolate and portray Muslims as uncivilised, anti-democratic and barbaric (Koeppel, 2019). Through the enemification technique they succeeded to persuade the public of the existence of the “other” society, a society fanatic (ibid). Enemification is described by Koeppel as the process of constructing Muslims as enemies who resist French values such as democracy, secularism, equal rights and progress (ibid). The election of Donald Trump as president further proves the popularity of this agenda, his call for a “Muslim Ban” and his explicit statement that the US’s number one priority is the “fight against Islamism” clearly emphasises this trend. Not to mention the effect on his electoral audience- when he hastily announced in an interview- “I think Islam hates us”. When the term “Islamism” is used to describe both the moderate religious movements like Ennahda, and to describe murderous terrorist groups like Da’esh, the word loses its real definition, and thus is replaced with one that is directly infused with violence. It would be incorrect and unjust to use the word- “Islamism” or “Islamist”- to refer to both opposite ends of the spectrum.
Hassan Al-Banna, the son of a preacher and Islamic author, was exposed to traditional Islamic principles from a very young tender age. He was devoted to studying the Quran and was involved in many religious groups, which he took very personal and sought to develop throughout his life. As a teacher, Banna was well educated in the hadiths and Quran, he was also concerned with the rising corruption and growing Westernisation of Egyptian society as a result of British colonial rule. Banna’s early education as well his personal background contributed tremendously to his future political and religious views which made him well versed in the socio-political conditions of his country in the early C20. Banna would strive to spread the message of gradual Islamisation of society, mainly through peaceful activities in coffeeshops, and refusing violence. Banna explicitly acknowledged the importance of state structures and institutions and worked to eventually reform them under the notion of God’s sovereignty.
When Banna founded the MB in 1928 his primary concern was the “defence” of the homeland and Islam, with two main purposes: “the removal of colonial powers and influence from Egypt and the gradual establishment of an Islamic sates that would become an example for Muslim nations” (Ardovini, 2017). This does hint to the early influence of nationalism into the rising popularity of Islamism in society. Banna believed in the bottom-up approach, starting by changing the individual, and ending by ultimately changing society. “Muslims, this is a period of rebuilding: re-build yourselves, and your Umma will as a consequence be rebuilt” clearly stressing the responsibility of the sole individual. This demonstrates the notion that MB was founded as an evolutionary movement rather than a revolutionary, contrary to what Roy believed.
Abu Ala Mawdudi embarked on his mission to redevelop the Islamist revivalist discourse before finally creating his own Indian branch the Jamat-I-Islami in 1948. Mawdudi strayed from the foundations of Banna and MB through one main exception, and that was Mawdudi’s interpretation of the concept of jihad. While Banna viewed jihad as a personal battle against one’s self-desires, Mawdudi on the other hand, did not condemn the Jamaat-i-islami from the practise of violent armed jihad in India. Mawdudi claimed that Jahiliyyah has not yet been abolished with the advent of Islam but rather it exists in the contemporary Muslim world (Ardovini, 2017). Jahiliyyah is a concept in Islam, which describes the state of the Arabian Peninsula prior to the advent of Islam as in the “age of ignorance” from divine guidance. Mawdudi went on to call for jihad against those Muslim countries, who in his opinion have lost the way thus creating major tensions within the practices of the concept of political Islamism that Banna first envisioned (ibid).
Qutb went on to develop the notion of jahiliyya to its extreme limits, and took ownership of his new further developed concept. Qutb then proscribed jahilliya to be the state of many modern Arab governments, secular regimes and in general Western values (Volpi, 2003). He regards this as the number one obstacle that prevents the achievements of an Islamic society. In ‘Milestones’, his most prominent work, Qutb argues that such problems can only be removed through the practice of jihad- which includes both the personal struggle and the violent armed struggle (Sheperd, 2003). He developed certain specific notions that would justify that practise of armed jihad against the repressive regimes, which encouraged many young Egyptian Islamists especially under the tyrannical Gamal Nasser regime. This understanding of the concept of jihad is thought to have inspired militant groups like Hamas and Hezbollah.
Abdullah Azzam, the close companion of Osama Bin-Laden, is often heard in his sermons citing Qutb’s quotes to attract the compulsive young militants. During the 1980s Azzam was allowed to travel the world to recruit mujahideen for the ‘religious compulsory war’ to repel the communist aggressors in Afghanistan. Ironically, the general Western consensus perceived this ‘honourable’ war as legitimate jihad and so Azzam was granted almost free non-restricted movement, so far that he travelled to US to preach and recruit fighters (McGregor, 2002). Through his sermons “Jihad and the rifle alone; no negotiations, no conferences and no dialogues”, which was acutely borrowed from Qutb’s thinking, many youths were successfully lured to Afghanistan (McGregor, 2002). While Banna argued for the gradual reform of state institutions and society, Qutb approved the call for immediate armed jihad, this further illustrates the tensions within the doctrine itself. Qutb’s call for jihad to achieve political aims, and his extreme concept of jahiliyya were in contrary to the interpretation of Political Islam introduced by Banna and the MB. As a result of his extreme views, Qutb strayed and isolated himself from the MB fundamental ideology, and thus it is inaccurate to relate his impact to that of the MB.
On 30th June 2012, Dr Mohamed Morsi was elected as the first post-revolutionary civilian President in the first ever democratic elections held in Egypt. This was also the first time ever an Islamist legitimately won and rose into power through the ballot box. This was a major surprise to some international and regional spectators, who were troubled by the prospect of a new Islamist government and their potential radical aptness. Nevertheless, the FJP led by Dr Morsi, did avoid policies that would antagonise or control the private life of citizens, instead he focused to solve the five main issues that he saw adversely affected the ordinary Egyptians everyday life (Ardovini, 2017). Those problems were as listed: the lack of bread, and fuel, traffic, poor sanitation and the lack of security (ibid). By the 3rd of July 2013, Dr Morsi was deposed and arrested through a coup d’état staged by the Egyptian Military, led by General Sisi who claimed to be representing the people of Egypt. In June 2015 Dr Morsi and 100 other members of the MB were sentenced to death, after they were convicted of collusion with foreign militants- Hamas and Hezbollah. The death sentence was later overturned. Dr Morsi died from a heart attack while on trial in a court cage. Hosni Mubarak, the overthrown former dictator was then released from prison. Banna was assassinated in broad daylight, Qutb was executed in prison, Dr Morsi died in court- one can see the common dominator here. While the MB disposal was regarded by many as the ultimate proof of political Islam’s failure to govern, it is essential to mention the many factors that were ignored and disregarded. Mubarak’s quick removal and the ensuing power vacuum that resulted represented the first real opportunity for the MB to participate in politics. One could argue that the greatest mistake MB committed was to participate in the post-revolutionary elections. The conditions were set, that whoever would be elected, would face tremendous challenges to reverse the impact of decades of corruption, to rewrite the constitution, to tackle the residues of deep state, ensure smooth democratic transition and to please anxious protestors. Despite the MB being the oldest grassroot opposition movement in Egypt, due to them being repressed and prosecuted throughout their existence, the MB have zero experience in local or regional governance (Ardovini, 2017). It was rather an over-ambitious, overzealous project, from the prison cells to the presidential palace. Egypt’s history and socio-political background meant that winning elections was not sufficient to rule, but to be accepted and approved by both the population and the military elite are key to govern successfully. And the MB just overestimated how much power they could yield over both units. After the fiasco of 2013, MB was officially outlawed as a terrorist organisation in Egypt, soon UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kazakhstan and Russia followed suit with Trump launching an investigation and the UK publishing a “Muslim Brotherhood Review” that condemns MB. By framing the MB as a terrorist organisation, not only does it tarnish the core principles of a democracy, but it also insults the millions of Egyptians who voted freely for their first time ever. Austria and France have joined the trend and banned ‘political Islam’. Chancellor Sebastian Kurz of Austria says, “In the fight against political Islam- the ideological basis behind it- we are going to create a criminal offence called ‘political Islam’ (Jones, 2020)
After the removal of Morsi by the coup d’état, Roy stated that “The failure of political Islam is not the political future of the Islamists; it is the collapse of Islamism as political ideology” insinuating that Islamism as whole has lost its standing (Roy, 2013). Roy claims that “Islamism is a failure historically: neither in Iran nor in liberated Afghanistan has a new society been established. The failure of Islamism does not mean that parties such as the Algerian FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) will not achieve power, but only that those parties will not invent a new society” (Roy, 1992). The most famous Islamist group, the Egyptian MB has never actually claimed to wanting to create a new society, they have explicitly stated to reform society, the group identifies as an evolutionary group as opposed to a revolutionary one. The MB apparent “failure” can be credited to both external and internal factors. Roy understands failure as being principally an intellectual one.
It is factually incorrect to state that an Islamist government has never successfully managed to establish a society, that can be disproved by the case of Iran. The belief that the Afghan mujahideen were incapable of seizing complete power was disproved in the 1996 Peshawar accord with the end of the civil war and the victory of the Taliban over the secular forces. In Palestine, much to the dismay of Arab and Western leaders, the Islamist party Hamas won majority in the 2006 elections. In 2002 the Islamist-esque Akp won majority in the Turkish parliamentary elections, which they would then continue to dominate. Bearing in mind post Arab spring Islamists emerged to dominate the political arena in Tunisia, Morocco and briefly in Egypt. So, the question could be asked to whom has the Islamist movement lost its credibility? Is it in the opinion of the Islamists themselves, who have reached their peak in 2012? Or would that be in the Western opinion, who fail to acknowledge or accept an Islamist government when there was one, which in turn fail to acknowledge the clout and significance of the ideology today.
In an interview conducted in 2002, Roy describes Akp as “successor of the Refah, is the Turkish equivalent of a Christian democracy. A party which accepts democracy, strives of values and religious symbolic but accepts diversity and pluralism” he ends by saying “it’s okay”, twenty years later he radically changes his position (UCTV 2002). In an interview regarding the conversion of Hagia Sophia to a mosque, Roy remarked “Islamising stones is easier than Islamising souls”, he went on to criticize “Why is he doing this now and not 20 years ago when he came to power?… Apparently there has been little popular enthusiasm for the transformation… only a few thousand believers attended the prayers” (Güvercin, 2020). Well to think that just over 20 years ago, Erdogan was imprisoned and briefly banned from politics for reciting an Islamic poem. To reopen Hagia Sophia in that ultra-secularist military dominated climate (when the mere hijab was banned in public sectors) would have most certainly been a death sentence, he would’ve likely been ousted and executed like his predecessors. According to official reports (Sabah 2020) the first prayer in Hagia Sophia after 86 years attracted over 350,000 worshippers as opposed to Roy’s “few thousands”, even amidst the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. This illustrates the general bias that Roy attempts to portray Political Islam movements, incorrect inaccurate and obsessive information. It is without a doubt that Erdogan, uses domestic triumphs and neo-ottoman references to distract from economic and foreign policy challenges (Kutlay et al, 2021). But it is unjust to downplay its effect.
One point that Roy fails to mention in his comprehensive assessment of “failure”- is the role of regional and sometimes Western-led conspiracy to block and prevent any emerging prevalent success for Political Islam throughout Middle East and North Africa. There is absolutely no doubt that a large presence of foreign covert intervention contributed to the demise of several Islamist rooted movements who were on the verge of some political success. Professor John Foran includes an important segment regarding FIS local victory in 1991 in his book ‘Taking Power’ page 213 – The prospect of turning power over to Islamists split the ruling party, and a thinly disguised military coup occurred just before the final round of the elections… with Western banks and governments promptly granting a $1.45 billion credit to ease pressure on the new military regime. The world will thus never know if the Islamist party could have government democratically or solved Algeria’s massive economic problems because the old regime backed by the West, showed it will not give up power through democratic means” (Foran, 2005). In 2015 the New York Times published an article titled “Recordings suggest Emirates and Egyptian Military pushed for ousting of Morsi” detailing monetary contract between UAE and the Egyptian military (Kirkpatrick, 2015).
In line with US foreign policy interest, Biden has made it clear that Erdogan and Akp do not fit their agenda. In a meeting with his cabinet, Biden revealed his intentions to oust Erdogan. “He has to pay a price” Biden declared, he suggests that Washington support Turkish opposition leaders “to be able to take on and defeat Erdogan. Not by a coup” he repeats, “Not by a coup, but by the electoral process” (Aljazeera, 2021).
To conclude, political Islam is far from doomed, it is likely to resurface in greater magnitude in the not-so-distant future. It has been proven, that with free elections, political Islam is likely to succeed as has been witnessed in the first ever democratic elections in Turkey (Menderes), Algeria (FIS), Egypt (FJP) and Palestine (Hamas). When given the opportunity and with the absence of foreign covert operations -political Islam can succeed and can radically change societies as history has proved.
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