Student Spotlight: How Has China’s Foreign Policy Changed Since Xi Jinping Became President in 2013?

The student spotlight reignites with this new piece from Albert Bischoff examining leadership in the People’s Republic of China. It was written for IP1040: Studying Politics and is great example of analysis from a first year City student. Congratulations Albert!

We accept submissions to the Student Spotlight at politicsblog@city.ac.uk


China’s foreign affairs prior to Xi Jinping’s arrival is most notably associated with the doctrine Tao Guang Yang Hui, which officially translates to ‘keeping a low profile’ (Zhongying, 2020, p.3). Formulated by Deng Xiaoping between 1989-91, this policy was largely upheld under his successors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao (Ibid, p.9). However, having consolidated power in 2013, Xi set in motion Xin Xing, a new doctrine encapsulating a ‘new era’ in China, interpreting China as a ‘new major country’ with ‘new major country relations’ (Ibid, p.10-11). This essay argues that Xi has changed China’s foreign policy in three fundamental ways; firstly, Xi has changed China’s ambitions as a global player, secondly, Xi has established China as economic global competitor, and thirdly Xi has made China a more aggressive and assertive nation on the global stage.

The first way in which Xi has changed China’s foreign policy is that he’s set China out to be more ambitious on the global stage. The doctrine Tao Guang Yang Hui was framed by the principles that China would not take the lead, nor would it challenge the superpower the United States and its primacy in the world (Zhongying, 2020, p.3-4). However, it appears Xi has lifted these constraints, and now seeks a more proactive and expansionist foreign policy, positioning China as the most prominent rising power (Kim, 2016, p.27), acquiring a role in the ‘group of two’ otherwise referred to as the G2 – the United States and China (Joseph, 2019, p.19). Accordingly, Xi first demonstrated this proactive approach when he in 2013 met with US President Obama to propose a new concept as the basis of the future conduct of their bilateral relationship defined by the three core features; ‘non-conflict/confrontation’, ‘mutual respect’, and ‘win-win cooperation’ (Zhang, 2015, p.14), proclaiming China’s stance in the conversation which had in the previous decades been single-handed defined by US initiatives. As Yongnian Zheng summarises it, ‘gone are the days when China is content with being a mere participant or follower’ (2014, p.63). With that said, a critique of Xi’s ambitious expansionist foreign policy follows Shi Yinhong’s argument that China could risk facing a ‘strategic overreach’ (Zhongying, 2020, p.23), alluding to Paul Kennedy’s theory about imperial overstretch and its linkage to great power decline (Xuetong, 2016, p.1). Though it must be noted that China is currently a rising power and not a great power, Yinhong’s point is still relevant as the CCP has acknowledged that the consequences of COVID-19 have unveiled to be a ‘big test’ for China’s ‘governance system and governance capacity’, specifically in relation to the implementation of its Belt and Road initiative and its trade with its foreign markets (Zhongying, 2020, p.23).

The second way in which Xi has changed China’s foreign policy is that he’s establishing China as a provider of alternatives to that of Western states in the global economy. Whilst the Tao Guang Yang Hui doctrine indicated that China would not attempt to export its political ideology of a ‘development model’, nor would it attach any political strings to its development cooperation with developing countries (Zhongying, 2020, p.4), Xi’s Xin Xing policy conveys rather opposite export ambitions. Zhongying Pang claims that Xi envisions China’s exports to further expand to include a political dimension, namely the projection of its developments and governance models (Ibid, p.19). As Xi Jinping put it himself, China is ‘blazing a new trail for other developing countries to achieve modernization. It offers a new option for other countries and nations’ (cited in Joseph, 2019, p.18). China has exhibited this approach by sponsoring the Belt and Road Initiative, an initiative that is emphasised to bring mutual benefits to China’s ‘new regional order’, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, designed as an alternative to the US dominated World Bank (Zhongying, 2020, p.20). Furthermore, China has attempted to match the efforts of Western nations in providing extensive aid to other countries and continents to fight the pandemic, providing a so called ‘China model’ to containing the coronavirus (Ibid, p.26). However, as Jessica Weiss argues, China’s economic nor political model may be well suited for export (Ibid, 2019, p.96), on the basis that China’s enormous internal market, abundant labour, and decisive hierarchical authoritarian government are mostly unique to it and will be difficult for developing countries to copy (Ibid, p.93). William Joseph adds the issue of China’s ‘big problem’ with corruption to the argument, noting that ‘there is considerable irony in the fact that the PRC has been considered as a model for third world development’ (Joseph, 2019, p.16).

The third way in which Xi has changed China’s foreign policy is that he’s made China more aggressive and assertive in its international affairs, especially in the regards to protecting its national interests. This approach has been coined as the ‘wolf warrior’ approach and was first tied to China’s combative stance to Western criticism about the source of the coronavirus (Zhongying, 2020, p.21), but more generally however, this coercive form of diplomacy reflects Xi’s uncompromisable approach to the issues of the Chinese territorial disputes in the Asian regional order. Xi has described China’s claim to sovereignty over territories in the South China Sea such as Hong Kong and Taiwan, as ‘inalienable’ parts of Chinese territory since ancient times (cited in Kim, 2016, p.35). As Jihyun Kim describes it, ‘the power game in the South China Sea is not merely an isolated issue but a significant piece of the overall picture that will complete’ China’s identity and will re-emerge it as a dominant power after a century of plundering and exploitation (Ibid, p.28). Hence, China’s ‘new’ assertiveness has placed an unprecedented emphasis on the importance of protecting China’s national interests. Nonetheless, Joseph Fewsmith mentions that the element of ‘new’ in China’s assertive approach to the Asian regional order, may be an interpretation constructed by external observers (Ibid, 2021, p.6). Whilst the phrase of the Deng doctrine Tao Guang Yang Hui translates to ‘keeping a low profile’, the policy does not necessarily mean the absence of any conflict at all (Ibid, p.9). After all, under the rule of Deng and his like-minded successors Jiang and Hu, China was engaged in similar territorial disputes to that of which we see in today’s era.

In conclusion, though Zhongying describes Xi’s Xin Xing policy to be but a revision of Tao Guang Yang Hui to suit China’s growing presence on the world stage (2020, p.8), most Chinese scholars will nevertheless still agree that China is exercising a more active and assertive diplomacy under Xi (Zhang, 2015, p.18) in playing a leading role in shaping the new world order.

Bibliography

  1. Fewsmith, J. (2021), Rethinking Chinese Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  1. Joseph, W. A. (2019), Politics in China: An Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  1. Kim, J. (2016), ‘Possible Future of the Contest in the South China Sea’, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol.9, No.1, pp.27-57.
  1. Lanteigne, M. (2020) Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction, (4th Edition), Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge.
  1. Weiss, J. C. (2019), ‘A World Safe for Autocracy? China’s Rise and the Future of Global Politics’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.98, No.4, pp.92-98.
  1. Xuetong, Y. (2016), ‘Political Leadership and Power Distribution’, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol.9, No.1, pp.1-26.
  1. Zhang, J. (2015), ‘China’s new foreign policy under Xi Jinping: towards ‘Peaceful Rise 2.0’?, Global Change, Peace & Security, Vol.27, No.1, pp.5-19
  1. Zheng, Y. (2015), ‘China’s Foreign Policy: The Unveiling of President Xi Jinping’s Grand Strategy’, East Asian Policy, Vol.7, No.1, pp.62-82.
  1. Zhongying, P. (2020), From Tao Guang Hui to Xin Xing: China’s Complex Foreign Policy Transformation and Southeast Asia, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing

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