I wanted to write about HMS Barham having vaguely heard about her convoy duties and seeing reference to her being destroyed by a torpedo. I had read about her sister ship HMS Warspite, partly because I had made a construction kit of Warspite as a boy. This class seemed old fashioned compared with the later WW2 ships of the King George V class but her deeds seemed “glamorous” in WW2, as flagship in the Second Battle of Narvik in Norway, for example. By comparison Barham only received a few mentions, usually on escort duty. The more I have read, however, the more Barham’s standing has risen. Her service was far more involved than occasional duties but I started to see her as an “unlucky” ship.
Operation “Menace” in Dakar
The Battle of Dakar, also known as Operation Menace, was a futile attempt by the Allies in September 1940 to capture the strategic port of Dakar in French West Africa (now known as Senegal). On 23rd September leaflets were dropped on Dakar by plane. The Free French then flew aircraft from HMS Ark Royal and landed at the airport but the aircrews were immediately taken prisoner. At 10:00 Vichy ships trying to leave the port had warning shots fired across them by HMAS Australia. As those ships returned to port, Vichy-controlled coastal batteries opened fire on Australia. An engagement between the Allied fleet and the shore batteries continued for several hours. In the afternoon Australia intercepted and fired on the Vichy destroyer L’Audacieux, setting her on fire and causing her to be beached. That same afternoon an attempt was made to put Free French troops ashore on a beach at Rufisque, to the south east of Dakar. The attack failed due to fog and heavy fire from strongpoints along the beach.
Over the next two days the Allied fleet continued to attack the coastal defences and the Vichy forces continued to defend them. Richelieu was hit by two 15” shells from HMS Barham. On the second day of action guns 7 and 8 (in turret number two) of Richelieu failed straight away so the following day the crews were switched around and main turret number 1 was used. Charges left by the battleship Strasbourg in Dakar during winter 1939 were used but were ineffective. Over the two days Richelieu fired a total of 24 rounds but no hits were recorded.
During these engagements two Vichy submarines were sunk and the destroyer L’Audacieux was damaged. The Allied fleet also suffered damage. Barham was hit by two shells from the coastal defence batteries and the battleship HMS Resolution was torpedoed by a submarine. The cruisers Australia and Cumberland were also damaged.
Overall the Battle of Dakar did not go well for the Allies. The Vichy forces did not back down and Resolution was so heavily damaged she had to be towed to Cape Town. During most of this conflict bombers of the Vichy French Air Force based in North Africa attacked the British base at Gibraltar. On 24th September about 50 aircraft dropped 150 bombs while on 25 September about 100 aircraft dropped 300 bombs on the harbour and dockyards. Most of the bombs missed. Some damage was caused but few casualties were suffered. Only a British armed trawler was sunk by direct hits and finally the Allies withdrew, leaving Dakar and French West Africa in Vichy hands.
Battle of Cape Matapan
In March 1941 a cryptographer at Bletchley Park decoded an Italian message and three days later decoded a second message which reported the sailing of an Italian Battle Fleet comprising three battleships, six heavy cruisers, two lightcruisers and destroyers which were going to attack the merchant convoys supplying British forces. The intelligence breakthrough was concealed from the Italians. As a further deception Admiral made a surreptitious departure from his golf club after dark to avoid being seen boarding his flagship, HMS Warspite. An evening party was advertised that night but it was never going to happen. In addition the Italians had been wrongly informed that the Mediterranean Fleet had only one operational battleship and no aircraft carriers whereas it actually had three battleships and carrier HMS Formidable had joined recently.
The Allied force was thus the British Mediterranean fleet consisting of HMS Formidable and the battleships HMS Barham, Valiant and Warspite. These were accompanied by the 10th Destroyer Flotilla and the 14th Destroyer Flotilla plus two extra destroyers. Force B, under Admiral Sir Henry Pridham-Whippell, consisted of the British light cruisers HMS Ajax, Gloucester and Orion, the Australian light cruiser HMAS Perth and three destroyers. There were also allied warships attached to convoys which were available.
The Italian fleet was led by Ammiraglio Iachino’s flagship, the modern battleship Vittorio Veneto, screened by four destroyers of the 13th Flotilla. The fleet also included most of the Italian heavy cruiser force, Zara, Fiume and Pola, accompanied by four destroyers of the 9th Flotilla; and Trieste, Trento and Bolzano accompanied by three destroyers of the 12th Flotilla and two destroyers of the 16th Flotilla. Joining them were the light cruisers Duca degli Abruzzi and Guiseppe Garibaldi and two destroyers of the 16th Flotilla. None of the Italian ships had radar, unlike several of the Allied ships.
On 27th March Vice-Admiral Pridham-Whipple with the cruisers Ajax, Gloucester, Orion and Perth and a number of destroyers sailed from Greek waters for a position south of Crete. Admiral Cunningham with Formidable, Warspite, Barham and Valiant left Alexandria on the same day to meet the cruisers. The Italian fleet was spotted by a Sunderland flying boat at 12 o’clock, depriving Iachino of any advantage of surprise. The Italian admiral also learned that Formidable was at sea, thanks to a decryption team aboard Vittorio Veneto. Nevertheless, after some discussion, the Italian headquarters decided to go ahead with the operation, to show the Germans that they were worthy fighters and having confidence in the higher speed of their warships. On 28th March an IMAM Ro.43 seaplane launched by Vittorio Veneto spotted the British cruiser Squadron at 06:35. At 07.55 the Trento group encountered Admiral Pridham-Whipple’s cruiser group south of the Greek island of Gavdos. The British ships were heading to the south-east and thinking they were attempting to run from their larger ships, the Italians gave chase, opening fire at 08:12 from 24,000 yards. The three heavy cruisers fired repeatedly until 08:55, with Trieste firing 132 armour-piercing rounds, Trento firing 204 armour-piercing and 10 explosive shells, and Bolzano firing another 189 armour-piercing shells, but the Italians experienced trouble with their rangefinding equipment and did not record any significant hits. HMS Gloucester fired three salvos in return which fell short but they did cause the Italians to make a course change.
As they had not reduced the distance after an hour, the Italian cruisers broke off the chase, turning to the north-west on a course to rejoin Vittorio Veneto. The Allied ships also changed course, following the Italian cruisers at extreme range. Iachino let them come on in the hope of luring the British cruisers into the range of Vittorio Veneto’s guns. The Italians eavesdropped on Orion’s signal that she had sighted an unknown unit and was going to investigate. At 10:55 Vittorio Veneto joined the Italian cruisers and immediately opened fire on the shadowing Allied cruisers. She fired 94 rounds in 29 salvos from a distance of 25,000 yards, all well aimed but falling wide of the target. (Another 11 rounds got jammed in the barrels). The Allied cruisers, until then unaware of the presence of a battleship, withdrew, suffering slight damage from 381mm shell splinters.
Cunningham’s force which had been attempting to rendezvous with Pridham-Whipple, attacked with torpedo bombers from HMS Formidable at 09:38, attacking Vittorio-Veneto with little effect but their manoeuvring out of the way of torpedoes made it difficult for the Italian ships to stay in pursuit. Iachino broke off the chase at 12:20 and retired towards cover at Taranto. There were then two further attacks by torpedo bombers on Vittorio-Veneto which was hit on the outer port propeller. Cunningham heard of the damage gave chase. The third attack by Albacores and Fairy Swordfish took place on the Italian squadron which had formed three columns and was using smoke, searchlights and a heavy barrage to protect Vittorio-Veneto. These tactics protected the battleship but one torpedo hit Pola which had nearly stopped to avoid running into Fiume and could not take any evasive action. Unaware of Cunningham’s pursuit a squadron of cruisers and destroyers was ordered to return to help Pola. At 20:15 Orion’s radar picked up a ship apparently virtually at a standstill and this turned out to be the crippled Polo.
The bulk of the Allied forces detected the Italian Squadron shortly after 22:00 and were able to close without attracting attention. The Italian ships had no radar and could not detect British ships other than by sight. The Italians could not entertain the idea of night actions and their main gun batteries were not prepared for action. At 22:20 they duly spotted the British ships by sight but thought they were Italian! The battleships Barham, Valiant and Warspite were able to close to 3,800 yards and opened fire. The Allied searchlights (including those aboard HMS Valiant under the command of the young Prince Phillip) lit up the enemy. Fuime and Zara were soon destroyed. Two Italian destroyers were sunk in the first five minutes and two more managed to escape under a smoke screen, one of them with heavy damage. The Allied ships hung around to pick up survivors but left in the morning fearing Axis air attacks. A message was sent by Cunningham to say the ships had ceased rescue operations but that they would grant safe passage to a hospital ship.
Matapan was subsequently seen as Italy’s greatest defeat at sea, as it lost a cruiser division. The British in the Mediterranean lost the heavy cruiser York and the light cruiser Bonaventure during the same period. In fact the British lost four heavy cruisers in all during the war, being the York, Exeter, Cornwall and Dorsetshire, whereas at Matapan the Italians lost three in a night. However they had established a potential threat that forced Britain to keep their battleships ready during the operations.
Sunk by U331
On 24th November 1941 Barham sailed with the fleet for an operation between Crete And Cyrenaica. The next day she was hit by three torpedoes from U331 off Sollum.
(Captain) L.H. McDonald was in HMS Barham, serving as Flag lieutenant to Vice Admiral Sir H.D. Pridham-Whippell who was the second in command of the Mediterranean Fleet, and was also Squadron Signal Officer of the 1st Battle Squadron and so had a ringside seat.
During the previous two months or so the 1st Battle Squadron flag changed repeatedly. P-W and staff moved to Malaya and Queen Elizabeth, and Rear Admiral B. S. Rawlings took over temporarily from P-W who became Vice Admiral Light Forces. During this time Barham was bombed and severely damaged by the Luftwaffe and had to go to Cape Town for extensive repairs. On her return McDonald teamed up again with P-W when he shifted his flag back to the battleship. Towards the end of 1941 the Med Fleet was experiencing increased activity, as the Luftwaffe became increasingly aggressive during the advance of the Africa Korps towards Alexandria. In November 1941 evidence showed that two convoys were being sent from Italy to Benghazi to reinforce the Africa Korps. The C.in C. (Cunningham) ordered the 7th and 15th Cruiser Squadrons to sea to attempt to intercept and destroy these convoys. Late in the afternoon of 24th November 1941 Warspite (C.in C), Barham and Valiant and a screen of nine destroyers sailed from Alexandria to provide heavy gun cover for the cruisers. Shortly after 4 pm McDonald was on the Admiral’s Bridge when all hell broke loose.
The ship had been hit amidships by torpedoes on the port side. She was steaming at about 20 knots at the time and immediately began to list alarmingly to port. All electric motors had stopped, all power had gone, the ship was “dead” and it was every man for himself. The torpedoes had apparently hit the ship just aft of the funnel. Before McDonald left the bridge, the conning tower of a submarine surfaced about 150 yards on the port side and stayed above water for perhaps a minute before the U-Boat dived again. McDonald assumed this was because the submarine captain had fired all his bow tubes at once and had not compensated quickly enough with water to keep the conning tower below the surface.
Meanwhile Captain CE Morgan was commanding HMS Valiant and he described the final moments of the battleship.
The ships had been sailing west in line ahead, with the Valiant immediately astern the Barham and with a destroyer spread out ahead. At 16:23 carrying out a normal zigzag, they turned to port together to bring the ships into echelon formation.
Suddenly at 16:25 there was a loud explosion, followed by two further explosions seconds later. Fountains of water and two enormous columns of smoke shot skywards. The smoke formed an enormous mushroom, gradually enveloping the whole of the Barham. The officer on watch immediately gave the command “Hard to port” to try to steer clear of the Barham. About 15 seconds later a submarine broke the surface, possibly forced up by the explosion, and was apparently attempting to cross the Valiant’s bows between us and the Barham. It was only about seven degrees off the starboard bow and 150 yards away. Morgan ordered “Full speed ahead, hard starboard”. The helm was by now hard to port so it was unable to be turned quickly enough to ram the submarine before it crash-dived only forty yards ahead to starboard. The submarine was visible for about 45 seconds and, at the same time as trying to ram, Valiant opened fire with her starboard pom-poms. The U-Boat was so close however that they could not depress the guns far enough so the shells passed harmlessly over her.
Captain Morgan then ordered “Amidships” again to avoid turning into Barham which was still under way with her engines running but listing heavily to port. As we came up alongside she listed to about 20 or 30° and her quarterdeck and forecastle could be seen through all the smoke. Men were jumping into the water and running up on the forecastle. The Barham was rolling on a perfectly even keel without sticking up by the bow or stern. At 16:28 she suddenly rolled, her mast striking the sea sharply a few seconds later. Water was now pouring into her funnels and There a great explosion soon followed which brought dark smoke mixed up with flames. Pieces of wreckage were flung into the air, and landed far and wide, Morgan ordering “Take cover”. That was the last they saw of the Barham, which had travelled nearly a mile since she was hit. When the smoke cleared the only signs left were a mass of floating wreckage. The 35,000 ton ship disappeared with amazingly quickly. It was just 4 minutes 35 seconds from the moment the torpedoes struck until she had completely disappeared.
Conclusion
So was HMS Barham an unlucky ship? She had been bombed and hit by shells quite a few times resulting in her being quite extensively repaired twice. She also sank one of her own destroyers and had now been sunk herself. We can swap notes with some of her contemporaries. Of the five ships of the Royal Sovereign class, of similar age, three survived Jutland (the other two were completed too late to take part), Royal Sovereign was in a damaging collision with HMS Tiger off Portland, and Royal Oak was torpedoed in October 1939 while at anchor in Scapa Flow. Resolution was hit by a bomb and slightly damaged in the Norwegian Campaign in April 1940 and she was also hit by a torpedo by a French submarine at Dakar, being subsequently towed by Barham to Freetown. Ramillies was hit by a torpedo from a Japanese mini submarine off Madagascar in May 1942. Only Revenge was relatively unharmed. Of Barham’s sister ships, Warspite, Valiant and Malaya survived Jutland, Queen Elizabeth having been in dock for a refit at the time. Queen Elizabeth narrowly avoided a torpedo attack but she was hit by limpet mines in an attack launched by Italian two-man chariots and she settled on the bottom of the harbour in Alexandria before being refloated and repaired. Warspite ran aground in September 1915 and was in two collisions, first with Barham and then with Valiant in 1915 and 1916. She was hit by a single bomb while taking part in the bombardment of Tripoli. Then she was hit by a guided bomb. So perhaps, apart from Warspite, she could be said to have fared just as badly as her contemporaries and I have not so far come across any references to her being unlucky. Indeed it looks as though a ship was lucky if it did not suffer some form of damage!
Before I carried out research I had only heard about HMS Barham as a convoy escort and to her being sunk. In fact she quite often served as flagship and was widely used in various fleet activity, particularly in WW2. She performed with distinction.
Bibliography
McDonald, I.H., Captain, RAN (Ret) Biographies and Personal Histories, WWll Operations June 1991 edition of the Naval Historical Review
Morgan, C.E., Captain (Ret) The Sudden Loss of H.M.S. Barham World War ll Today
Various Authors The Battle of Cape Matapan. Wikipedia
Various Authors The Battle of Dakar. Wikipedia
Whitley, M.J. Battleships of World War Two: An International Encyclopedia. Arms and Armour