Student Spolight

Student Spotlight: Is the post-colonial challenge to international relations’ Eurocentrism convincing? by Nadim Khan

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This week’s Student Spotlight comes from the postgraduate module IPM125: Theories of International Politics. Nadim Khan explores post-colonialism and its critique of mainstream IR theory

In this essay I will explain the meaning of Eurocentrism and postcolonialism in relation to the historic and ongoing hegemony of Western powers and institutions in international relations. My interest in this topic stems from my experiences and position as a British racial minority processing my identity within a white, heterosexual, male dominated country, and global society (Layton-Henry, 1984, pp. 14-15). Section 1 will display what Eurocentrism and postcolonialism are. Section 2 will explore Edward Said’s research on Orientalism. Section 3 will highlight the subaltern groups and the relationship of power with gender, class, and race. Section 4 will give examples of contemporary Eurocentrism and postcolonialism with a focus on the war on terror and political Islam. I will conclude by drawing on scholarship to summarise why the postcolonial challenge to Eurocentrism is convincing and what this aims to achieve.

Section 1 – Eurocentrism and the Postcolonial Challenge

Toray (2021, pp. 693-695) defines Eurocentrism as a systematic distortion of knowledge depicting Europe as superior to and separate from the non-West, creating a historical and ongoing spatial hierarchy. It has been supported by scholars who wrote world history in a teleological manner showcasing ‘Europe as the self-producing initiator and leader, taking humanity through the steps of progress,’ (Tolay, 2021, pp. 693-695), whilst simultaneously undervaluing the contributions of non-European actors. ‘Eurocentrism is distinct from other forms of ethnocentrism… due to its intimate association with a successful and hegemonic global power project,’ (Tolay, 2021, pp. 693-695), and is a form of the Foucauldian nexus between power and knowledge that has dominated the practice of International Relations over the last couple of centuries, (Tolay, 2021, pp. 693-695).

The political implications of this are the Western domination over international political and security institutions plus global political, security and economic issues, with most decisions made at the UN security council or by the IMF reflecting Western interests. The global community has been constructed to legitimise the interests of Western powers (Huntington, 1993. p. 67). The structuring of power is bound to the concepts of state sovereignty, anarchy, and world order in realist and neo-realist mainstream international relations theories, which makes them central analytic concerns. This understanding of power privileges hierarchy and a Eurocentric worldview whilst the impact of social relations is considered mysterious (Geeta and Nair, 2002, pp. 2-3). The concepts of state sovereignty and secularism are argued by some international scholars to have been embodied by the 1648 European Peace of Westphalia. Today ‘Western practices are seen as the engine of the international system, democracy, modernity, sovereignty, and human rights which influences any theories regarding modern international relations. Western liberal democracies are treated as the standard for civilised human conduct and the only entities capable of bringing order to the international system,’ (Kayaoglu, 2010, pp. 213-214).

Many international systems pre-existed the colonial era including Dar al-Islam, the Persianised world, and the Sanskrit cosmopolis (Eaton, 2020, pp. 10-18). These carried Indian, Chinese, and Persian ideals across the silk road to Europe including Indian contributions to state craft via the Arthashastra guide (Singh, 2017, pp. 460-485). The impact of imperialism is ignored by many English school scholars despite its existing influences. The wilful amnesia of international relations is to dissociate ‘the emergence of a modern, territorially sovereign state system in Europe from the genocide of indigenous peoples… the enslavement of the natives of Africa, and the colonisation of societies of Asia’ (Krishna, 2001, p. 401). Moving away from the Westphalian narrative provides a space to incorporate non-European ideas to create a more pluralistic international society, which better represents the world’s population, including Asian philosophies from the world’s most populated continent. The defence of traditional Asian values by Eastern regimes is called an example of resistance to Western neo-colonial domination by Freeman (2000, p. 46). It must be noted that supposed postcolonial arguments for cultural relativism are often made by political and economic elites who no longer practice traditional culture, and the imposition of traditional values is sometimes accomplished forcefully due to paternalism leading to further suffering (Donnelly, 2003, p. 637).

Postcolonialism is described by Hiddleston (2009, p. 24), as the political, economic, cultural, and philosophical responses to colonialism. This terminology has been criticised for undermining a critique of contemporary colonialist structures due to the word ‘post’ (Shohat, 1992, p. 107).  It has also been accused of merely deconstructing knowledge and of locating its analysis in French high theory rather than the material histories of indigenous people (Geeta and Nair, 2002, pp. 2-3). However, postcolonial theory addresses the ways in which historical processes are implicated in the production of politics including the construction of post-colonial national identities in opposition to European ones and their positioning in the world society as Europe’s “others”, despite many countries building their foundations on a European framework (Geeta and Nair, 2002, pp. 15-16; Grovogui, 2002, pp. 52-54; Kuru, 2015, pp. 356-357).

Westernised independence leaders from the colonial world used the Western language of human rights and ‘the rights of man’ as part of their larger battle for freedom. To achieve independence, they had to organise themselves into neo-Westphalian nation states to gain membership in the global political and economic system (Freeman, 2000, p. 53). The new borders had been created by colonial governments which balkanised homogenous groups, often sowing the seeds for conflict and developmental aid was based on Western preconditions, including trade liberalisation, free markets, and expansion of political space (Magu, 2021, pp. 7-9). Whilst modernisation in the West was achieved through cultural genocide, Sabaratnam (2011, pp. 797-799), explains that the understanding of peace and progress in non-Western countries must be relocated within the domestic history. Challenging Eurocentrism often leads to reproducing it via hierarchal structures as has been the case with Turkey and Iran, both of which overthrew monarchies to either modernise according to Western norms or in rejection of them (Kohn and McBride, 2011, p.10).

Fanon (1961, pp. 251-254), was one of the leading voices to expose the supposedly ideal European model of development and describe it as a path of accomplishment through enslavement and exploitation. He claimed that such an imitation could only create an equal or greater monster than Europe using America as an example of this. The need to create new solutions to what Europe had been unable to answer for its own people was emphasised. Whereas European nations developed on the backs of global exploitation, postcolonial countries are struggle in impoverished conditions under Western hegemony (Fanon, 1961, pp. 74-84). Non-Western people must eventually become European-like according to Eurocentrism whilst in the parallel study of Orientalism, the actual differences are ontological and permanent Tolay (2021, pp. 693-695).

Section 2 – Orientalism

Said states that the Orient is an integral part of European civilisation as the image, idea, personality, and experience of the West has been defined by itself to be in contrast with the Orient’s despotism, cruelty, and sensuality. The ontological and epistemological distinction made by the West towards non-Western factors forms the basis of Orientalism (1978, pp. 1-2). Said explained that Orientalism can be described as ‘a Western style for dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient’ (1978, p. 3). The Orient was not and is not free to think and act as a free subject outside of a network of Western interests. Said further claims that whilst Orientalism does not determine everything, only by understanding the theory can we understand how European culture was able to ‘manage and produce the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, and imaginatively during the colonial period’ (Said, 1978, p. 3).

Cultural leadership wherein certain cultural forms predominate others is defined by Gramsci as hegemony and it is the result of this cultural hegemony that gives Orientalism durability and strength. European ideas of Western and non-Western people have made one superior and one inferior. This ‘flexible positional superiority’ (Said, 1978, p. 7) is a strategy used by Orientalists to privilege the West across a range of relationships with the Orient. Today it is reinforced through the electronic, postmodern world via the media heightening the stereotypes introduced by nineteenth century academic demonisation (Said, 1978, p.26).

The initial expansion of the French Empire into Egypt showcased French power over an ancient source of knowledge and threatened Britain’s Empire in India. Egyptian and Indian modern realities were not considered whilst France and Britain sought to restore the regions from a present barbarism to former classical greatness associated with European memory (Eaton, 2020, p. 8; Krishna, 2001, pp. 418-419). Knowledge was accumulated on how to dominate native people and impose laws based on generalisations, amounting to structural genocide (Hallaq, 2018, p. 230; Said, 1978, pp. 86-87, 154, 210-211). Even Karl Marx was convinced that in destroying Asia, Britain was making it possible there for a regenerative social revolution (Said, 1978, pp. 154-155). France’s desire for an Empire to parallel Britain’s such as a French India led to the creation of Indochina (Said, 1978, p. 218). The native people were labelled with this identity without consideration for their diverse communities as had been the case with those grouped together by the Western term ‘Indians’ (Seth, 2011, pp. 178-179). The division of Asiatic Turkey regardless of ethnic and religious realities was a deliberate attempt to calm this Anglo-French rivalry. The epistemological framework out of which the region was divided was through years of Orientalist framing of the East primarily in terms of its worth to Europe (Gregory, 2004, p. 169; Said 1978, p. 221).

Varisco (2017, 292), has queried how we can end the cycle of guilt by essentialisation in the discourse surrounding Orientalism. However, we must compare the guilt placed on Germany to make amends and to unravel the ideology of political Nazism, with the failure of international relations to show the same humanity to the victims of colonialism. Instead of strengthening international law to prevent further injustices, the allies built the new international order based on power politics (Grovogui, 2001, pp.441-446; Muppidi, 2012, pp. 71-74; Rietzler, 2016, pp. 113-134). Said explains that ‘the accepted idea of the Western right to hold power over the non-Western world has been able to survive revolutions, world wars the collapse of Empires’ enabled by detachment from both reality and consequence (1978, p. 223). Nevertheless, it is praiseworthy that newer ideas are emerging in the subaltern communities from the once colonised, enslaved, and suppressed people (Said, 1978, p. 350-352).

Section 3 – Subaltern Groups

The subaltern project has challenged the elitism of Indian historiography project including in uncovering the perspective of the peasant insurgencies during colonial rule (Spivak, 1988). There has been a recent influence on postcolonial theory by Indian people (Pouillion and Vatin, 2015, p. 275), and an even wider range of backgrounds is needed to understand the relationships between race, class, gender, and sexuality as bases of power, their intersections in the construction of global power asymmetries and their roots in imperialist legacies. The liberal statement of reaching ‘the end of history’ in the form of the democratic, capitalist society masks the concept of power and omits the subaltern groups who underpin global hierarchies (Geeta and Nair, (2002, pp. 2-4). This is enabled by the universality of the language of mainstream international relations allowing it to speak for others whilst being rooted in Western humanist notions of rationality (Geeta and Nair, 2002, pp. 15-18). Racial hierarchies hold ideological significance in the production of US national identity and policies. These are influenced by the popular media which features racialised understandings of ethnic minority citizens, indigenous people, and non-white immigrants (Geeta and Nair, 2002, p. 18). On a global level, we can compare the depiction and the subsequent response to the deaths of civilians in New York on 9/11, and those killed in Kabul whilst suffering from famine, war, and brutality (Gregory, 2004, p. 53).

When considering gender in her renown piece ‘Can the Subaltern Speak,’ Spivak (1988), announces that ‘both as subject of colonial historiography and as the subject of insurgency, the ideological construction of gender keeps the male dominant. If in the context of colonial production, the subaltern has no history and cannot speak, the subaltern as female is even more in shadow.’

In terms of class, Spivak (1988), describes how colonial powers invested in law, transportation and education whilst destroying local industries and administration for the outflow of resources to Western nations. The epistemic violence of imperialism and the international division of labour is ignored by scholars such as Foucault. In the postcolonial era, there is less need for education in developing countries due to the desire for cheaper labour unprotected by working rights. Even amidst global movements for women’s and LGBTQ rights featuring members of the urban proletariat, there is an absence of the unorganised rural workers and tribal groups (Spivak, 1988). The Marxist idea of proletarian revolution has now been reworked by emphasising that the stages of economic development can differ for societies, and the importance of including indigenous people (Kohn and McBride, 2011, p. 11).

With regards to race, Geeta and Nair (2002, p. 20) explain that Europeans formalised its construction to prove themselves to be intellectually and morally superior. Race (alongside gender) has been central to the construction of nation and national identity, and Sabaratnam (2020, pp. 13-15), suggests that by subject-positioning whiteness in international relations, we can examine how Eurocentrism is enabled even if the life experiences of the subjects differ.

Western notions of sovereignty, and identity have been challenged by the significance of representation in international relations and the role of cultural processes through which the insecurities of states are produced. Although realists accept the existence of an anarchic environment, the concept is grounded in racialised and gendered assumptions (Geeta and Nair, 2002, pp. 15-18). Whilst theorists from postcolonial states have described relations in terms of anarchy such as the South Asian nuclear balance (Sridharan, 2011, pp.10-26), we must review the influence of domestic audiences and sources of legal authority to see how states differ and how they can be pulled apart (Magu, 2021, pp. 7-9).

Section 4 – Contemporary Western Eurocentrism

Huntington (1993, 63-64), refers to the Eurocentric views of the emergence of the modern international system through the Peace of Westphalia, before stating that a conflict between civilisations will occur due to their diversity, differing views on liberty and equality developed over centuries, the globalisation of the world, and the weakening of national identities. All these factors challenge Eurocentrism and Huntington warns that a ‘West at the peak of its power is confronting a non-Western world, that is increasingly turning inward and has the desire and resources to shape the world in non-Western ways,’ (1993, P. 64). Whilst his work was influential in justifying the initiation of the ‘war on terror,’ criticisms of Huntington’s vision including by Said point to his prescriptions on how to continue Western domination rather than challenge it. The integration of a wider world immersed in Western culture is stated to be important in maintaining Western hegemony, including Latin America which is sufficiently European to be a partner in comparison to a threatening Islamic civilisation (Huntington, 1993, p. 69).

Said expresses that the politicisation of the Arab world and Islam is due to Orientalist history, the struggle with Judeo-Christian Zionism, and the absence of any neutral cultural position for discussion (1978, p.27). He proposes that Orientalists should contemplate over the resistance of Islam to colonialism and how this has impacted the development of political Islam (Said, 1978, p. 279). The Middle East (a Western label) is identified with great power politics and the simplified depiction of a democratic Israel combatting extremist Arabs (Said, 1978, p.27). Any postcolonial challenge to this from the Arab world is hampered due to lack of funding and expertise. Many scholars are encouraged to emigrate to America themselves with the Arab world becoming a cultural, political, and intellectual satellite of the USA (Said, 1978, p. 322 – 325). Arab institutions have also not published Said’s further work on the corruption of Middle East regimes as he criticised their nationalist fervour (Said, 1978, p. 339). This attitude and the limited successes of Arab theorists stands in contrast to the initial passion observed by Fanon (1961, p. 172), with which Arab writers fanned the waves of pan-Arabism, reclaiming a glorious civilisation where Europe could only see barbarity.

Postcolonial Islamic modernists reimagined traditional sources as alternatives to the institutions and practices imposed by the colonial powers. The work of Sayyid ad-din al-Afghani presented Islam as a necessary source of unity, identity, and mobilisation against imperialism, whilst theorists on Westoxification (the disease of Western civilisation) influenced the Iranian revolution against the Western supported Shah (Kohn and McBride, 2011, p. 10). Islam was presented as the solution rather than Marxism, liberal constitutionalism, or human rights (Kohn and McBride, 2011, p. 54).

One of the modern justifications of colonialism over a Muslim region have been the promise of a coloniser to deliver individual rights whilst controlling their community rights. For example, the political position on the sexual rights for homosexual Afghans was highlighted to showcase the fundamental differences between the enlightened Christian West and the backwards Muslim Afghans (Barkawi and Stanski, 2012, pp. 123-124). Bearing in mind Europe’s negative historical impact on the experiences of Oriental homosexuals, Muslim institutions exist today which challenge both the Western ‘hijacking of queer sexual politics by nationalists and xenophobes,’ (Mepschen, Duyvendak, and Tonkens, 2010, p. 972), and the denial of sexual freedom by religious conservatives. They also make space for queer Muslims to choose alternative forms of sexual emancipation that deviate from Western normative articulations.

Conclusion

This essay has explored the historical origins of Eurocentrism, its current forms, and the postcolonial challenge to its hegemony to prove that the post-colonial challenge to international relations’ Eurocentrism is convincing. Dismantling the structures which were built to benefit Western powers, and broadening representation to prevent the marginalisation of communities within states alongside the respect for non-Western interests globally is the intended outcome of this challenge. However, hurdles remain in empowering the disadvantaged voices due to powerful Western influences, but also in reaching the subaltern as people who are starving, persecuted or illiterate cannot partake in a discussion on their rights (Freeman, 2000, p. 54). I have discovered that postcolonial theorists from developing countries are also unable to compete with American scholarship. Today the ‘South is enmeshed in a debt trap, broken into dozens of fractured and incoherent entities, beset with poverty, disease and underdevelopment, whilst the US remains the dominant power in large parts of the world’ (Said, 1978, p. 348). It is in acknowledging the global inequalities of power and analysing the historical knowledge foundations and imperialist structures whereby postcolonial theory is most valuable in challenging Eurocentrism. The imposition of Western norms to be accepted into the wider international society and institutions has hampered development or led to state oppression. Many people have rejected liberalism and embraced postcolonial political thought including political Islam as a response to the exploitation delivered through Western liberal ideals (Kohn and McBride, 2011, p. 13). Whilst rejecting Eurocentrism, ‘the rigid dichotomisation of Asian and Western values is not likely to find the best solutions for the needs of the people’ (Freeman, 2000, p. 56). The political challenge to Eurocentrism often ends up replicating it with a new hierarchy on a regional level, so we must examine what post-Eurocentrism would entail practically. I am sympathetic to the views of Ikenberry (2018, p. 82) who argues that there is no grand ideological alternative to liberal internationalism whose collapse would harm more people immediately. For now, global institutions must be reformed, and responsibilities distributed to represent the diffusion of power in an increasingly multipower world. The postcolonial challenge is helping to build a new convergence of anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism as the international movements of resistance to Eurocentric neoliberal globalisation (Callinicos, 2009, p. 227).

 

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